John Shotter, 14th
Feb 2001
MECHANICALLY ASSEMBLED WHOLES
VS.
LIVING, SELF-DEVELOPING, INDIVISIBLE WHOLES:
WITTGENSTEIN=S FOCUS ON CEASELESS, LIVING, RESPONSIVE
RELATIONS.
1) SEPARATE
ELEMENTS OF REALITY: Classically, we have been concerned with the
properties of certain objects (known to us by inference), existing in isolation
from each other (indifferently dead or alive), which are linked, if at all,
through various >dynamical= effects B characterized in >causal= terms B to other such entities of importance.
We might call
this Aa quantitative way of seeing the world.@ We can find its origins in Aristotle: he
defined Aquantity@ as that which has parts external to one
another. It is a Acategory@ in terms of which the world becomes visible
in a particular way, i.e., constituted in the form of Aparts external to one another.@ As a way of seeing, rather than being
abstracted from Athe
facts@ of world, Aquantity@is already present, ahead of time, as it
were, in this way of seeing.
Measurement
sciences: In the measuring
of quantities, whatever is being Ameasured@ is divided into Aunits@ which are Aexternal to one another,@ i.e., conceptualized as a string of units
juxtaposed along an imagined line which effectively constitutes a scale, within
a static space. To be prepare something
for measurement with such a scale, the >stuff= concerned has first to be divided into a
set of homogeneous parts upon which the scale can be intellectually
superimposed like a grid, framework, or structure (picture). Nature is then
seen in the perspective of the framework, which is not a part of nature at
all, but is intellectually imposed on it from the outside.
Mechanically
assembled wholes: Such
assembled systems are constructed piece by piece from parts external to one
another, that is, from parts which retain their character unchanged
irrespective of whether they are parts of the system or not. As such, any such
assemblage is an externally related, static unity, i.e., a structure
whose parts are all joined by third entities (glue, nails, etc.) into
unified structures -- as an automobile is welded or nut and bolted together.
Such static solely >spatial= objects have their being in classical,
neutral space and in classical, neutral time, which are both treated as empty,
unchanging >containers=, simply >there= for things to happen within them, and can
be >pictured= as such.
2) HUMAN
REALITIES AS INDIVISIBLE WHOLES: In contrast to Aassembled systems,@ people, as living beings, and many of their
other >constructions=, are certainly not constructed piece by
piece; on the contrary, they develop and grow. They develop from
simple, indivisible, unitary individuals into richly structured ones in such a
way, that their >parts= at any one moment in time owe not just
their character but their very existence both to one another and to
their relations with their >parts= at some earlier point in time B thus their history is just as important as
their momentary structure in their growth. Because of this, it is
impossible to picture such systems in spatial diagrams.
AHere the term >language-game= is meant to bring into prominence the fact
that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life@ (PI,1953, no.23).
Activities and
practices: Wittgenstein is
concerned with the complexly constituted, spontaneous activities of living
beings, as they are responsively interwoven in with the spontaneously
responsive activities of the others and othernesses around them. In being
ineradicably, dynamically intertwined with their surroundings, they only exist
as participant parts of an internally related unity, i.e., a whole whose
participant parts owe not just their character but their
very being to their living, responsive relation to their surroundings.
Such participant parts may have their being in very different time-spaces
(Bakhtin: Achronotopes@) according to the different Aforms of life,@ different styles of relationship within
which they do or can function as participants.
AWhen you are philosophizing you have to
descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there@ (Wittgenstein, 1980, CV, p.65).
The Bohr-Einstein controversy: This comparison parallels the Bohr-Einstein controversy: Einstein=s whole position rests squarely on the presumption that sense experience can be understood in terms of an idea of some external reality whose spatially separated parts are independent realities, in the sense that they depend on each other only via connections that respect space-time separation in the usual way... Bohr=s refutation of the ERP argument begins by emphasizing that quantum mechanics demands a radical change in what we mean by physical reality. The whole notion of separate Aelements of reality@ as applied to quantum systems, he claims, no longer has a precise meaning. What is important is the whole set of conditions under which a quantum experiment is made. Choose one set of conditions, and one particular aspect [set of relations] of the quantum system is revealed. Choose a different conditions, and a complementary aspect is exhibited B with no one aspect being superordinate.